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OIL RIGHTS IN THE GULF OF SUEZ
International law recognizes that coastal nations have the right to
exploit natural resources found in continental shelf areas beneath adja-
cent water bodies. In most situations the coastal nation entitled to this
right is easily identified as the sovereign in actual control of the land
immediately adjacent to the water body. However, the nation in physi-
cal control of such land may not be the sovereign thereof. In such a
case, both the nation having actual control and the nation claiming sov-
ereignty may assert the right to exploit natural resources in the adjacent
continental shelf. Such a situation currently exists in the Gulf of Suez.
When Israel invaded the Sinai in 1967 it acquired the possession but not
the sovereignty of that territory. Now, both Egypt, as sovereign, and
Israel, as occupant, claim the right to drill for oil in the adjacent conti-
nental shelf.
The Gulf of Suez is a semi-enclosed body of water which opens into
the Red Sea at the south and narrows into the Suez Canal at the north.
It is bordered on the east by the Sinai peninsula and on the west by the
African mainland. The Gulf is at no point deeper than 100 fathoms,
and its width never exceeds approximately 20 miles. The entire Gulf
will therefore be classified and analyzed under continental shelf doctrine.
There are several significant oilfields in western Sinai and beneath
the waters of the southern portion of the Gulf of Suez.' The major west-
ern Sinai oilfields, Abu Rudeis and Belayim, were producing oil even
before the Israeli invasion in October, 1967. These fields were exploited
by Israel from that time until they were returned to Egypt under the
terms of the 1975 Sinai disengagement agreement. Nevertheless, Israel
retains control over most of the Sinai, including the land which borders
the southern portion of the Gulf of Suez. This area of the Gulf, which
promises to have significant oil reserves, is the focal point of the current
Egyptian-Israeli oil dispute.
Egypt is currently producing oil from Al Murgan, an offshore
oilfield in the western half of the Gulf of Suez,2 and reserves apparently
extend into the eastern half of the Gulf as well.3 In 1964 Egypt granted
an exploration and development lease to the Gulf of Suez Petroleum
Company (GUPCO), a corporation jointly formed by the Egyptian gov-
1. TIME, Jan. 2, 1978, at 21. Egypt's proven reserves in western Sinai and beneath
the Gulf of Suez total three billion barrels.
2. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Feb. 16, 1977, at 3, col. 2.
3. Id. See also Washington Post, Feb. 14, 1977, § A, at 14, col. 4.
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ernment oil company and AMOCO International. 4 The lease included
areas beneath the eastern half of the Gulf of Suez which at the time of
the lease were clearly within Egyptian control, but it was not until late in
1976, long after Israel had occupied the eastern shore of the Gulf, that
GUPCO attempted to drill in the eastern portion of the Gulf.5
In the last year and a half, Israel has attempted to establish oil rights
in the eastern half of that portion of the Gulf of Suez adjacent to Israeli
occupied territory. To substantiate its claim, Israel has not allowed
Egyptian oil companies to drill for oil in the eastern half of the Gulf. A
dramatic episode occurred on September 2, 1976, when Israeli gunboats
fired on buoys anchoring an AMOCO drilling rig which had been set up
just across the midline of the Gulf.6 The gunboats escorted the rig out
of the "Israeli half" of the Gulf and have subsequently forbidden Egyp-
tian oil companies any access to that portion of the Gulf.7 Israel has
further asserted its claim by drilling oil wells at a point off the Sinai coast
near the town of Al Tur.8
The Gulf of Suez dispute is not unique. 9 All over the world there
are coastal territories, particularly islands, which are occupied by nations
with dubious claims to sovereignty.' 0 All of these cases require a deter-
4. The Egyptian government oil firm is the Egyptian General Petroleum Corpora-
tion. AMOCO is a subsidiary of Standard Oil Company of Indiana.
5. Washington Post, Feb. 14, 1977, § A, at 14, col. 4.
6. Washington Post, Sept. 8, 1976, § A, at 18, col. 1.
7. Id.
8. N.Y. Times, April 4, 1977, § 1, at 4, col. 3. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1977, § 1, at 1,
col. 1. Washington Post, Feb. 14, 1977, § A, at 14, col. 4.
9. There are a number of areas which are now, or soon may become, occupied by
force in circumstances which will give rise to questions of continental shelf rights similar to
those involved in the Gulf of Suez. One obvious area is the Gulf of Aqaba, which was
divided between Saudi Arabia and Egypt prior to the Six Day War. The issue there now is
whether Israel or Egypt has the right to drill in the western half of the Gulf. Another area
where such a dispute may arise is Somalia, where Ethiopia could occupy Somalia's Indian
Ocean coastline. Similarly, a dispute may arise over continental shelf rights in the Carib-
bean Sea if Guatemala should occupy portions of the Belize coastline. The most recent
addition to this list is the continental shelf area adjacent to that portion of Southern Leba-
non currently under Israeli occupation. See also examples given in note 10, infra.
10. See G. KNIGHT, THE LAW OF THE SEA: CASES, DOCUMENTS, AND READINGS 275-
281 (1978), and the material cited therein. Some islands which are currently the subject of
such dispute are: Paracel Islands in the South China Sea (recently occupied by the People's
Republic of China); the Spratly Islands, also in the South China Sea (claimed by the Re-
public of the Philippines and the People's Republic of China); Tao-yu-Tai (Sensaku) in the
East China Sea (contested between the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, and Japan);
Wai Islands in the Gulf of Thailand (occupied by Viet Nam and contested by Cambodia
and Thailand); Aegean Islands in the Aegean Sea (subject to claims by Greece and Tur-
key); Beagle Channel Islands (subject to claims by Chile and Argentina).
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mination of which nation is entitled to exploit the resources of the adja-
cent continental shelf."
Continental Shelf
Coastal nations claim the right to exploit resources beneath adjacent
water bodies under two doctrines: the territorial sea' 2 and the continen-
tal shelf.1 3 All littoral states now claim sovereignty over a "territorial
sea," a band of water (and the soil beneath it) adjacent to the coastline.' 4
The breadth of the territorial sea has never been established by interna-
tional treaty or convention, but current state practice indicates a con-
sensus favoring a maximum limit of twelve miles.' 5 Absent any
internationally binding agreement, individual nations have indepen-
dently determined the extent of their territorial seas.' 6 Israel, for exam-
ple, claims a territorial sea extending six miles from its coastline; Egypt
claims a territorial sea of twelve miles. 17
Israel and Egypt have not relied on territorial sea doctrine in sub-
stantiating their oil rights in the Gulf of Suez. In fact, Israel has asserted
de facto control out to the midpoint of the Gulf, which at some points
exceeds the six mile territorial sea claimed by Israel. 18 Accordingly, the
rights of Israel and Egypt will be examined under the doctrine of the
continental shelf. However, the ultimate issue would be the same under
either the law of the territorial sea or the continental shelf-should Israel
11. Id.
12. See Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958,
T.I.A.S. No. 5639 (effective September 10, 1964); U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/L 52 (1958), re-
printed in 38 State Dept. Bull. 1111 (1958) [hereinafter cited as 1958 Convention on the
Territorial Sea].
13. See Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, T.I.A.S. No. 5578 (effec-
tive June 10, 1964); U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/L 55 (1958), reprinted in 38 State Dept. Bull.
1121 (1958) [hereinafter cited as 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf].
14. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, art. 1: "The sovereignty of a State ex-
tends, beyond its land territory and its internal waters, to a belt of sea adjacent to its coast,
described as the territorial sea."
15. See 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, art. 3. The 12 mile limit has been
used in the Informal Composite Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/Wp.10 (July 15,
1977).
16. See Gormley, The Unilateral Extension of Territorial Waters, 43 U. DET. L.J. 695
(1966).
17. Limits in the Seas: National Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction, No. 36 (3d rev.
1975), U.S. Dep't of State, Office of the Geographer, at 60-61, 102-03.
18. Israel has never directly claimed territorial sea rights in the Gulf of Suez, but such
a declaration would probably be superfluous. Where a territorial sea does exist, it is
treated as an appurtenance which exists by operation of law. See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 124 (1966).
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as occupant or Egypt as sovereign be allowed to exercise the rights of the
coastal state in the adjacent seabed?
As a geological concept, the continental shelf denotes the extension
of the continental land mass under the adjacent sea to a point at which it
sharply drops off to greater depths.19 However, the doctrine has an en-
tirely different meaning when used in the context of international law.20
The legal doctrine has only developed since World War II, but the basic
concept of coastal state jurisdiction over the natural resources of the ad-
jacent continental shelf is now well established.2t
The first international codification of the legal regime of the conti-
nental shelf was the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf.22 In
defining the continental shelf, the Convention used the ambiguous con-
cept of exploitability,2 3 and the resulting confusion led to considerable
criticism.2 4 The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea is currently in the process of revising the 1958 Convention. The
draft for the new articles, the Informal Composite Negotiating Text
(ICNT), has proposed a new definition of the extent of the continental
19. See Knight, The Draft United Nations Convention on the International Seabed
Area. Background, Description, and Some Preliminary Thoughts, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 459
(1971).
20. 111 H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 144 (E. Lauterpacht ed. 1977):
"[Problems raised by the proclamations of the continental shelf cannot be resolved by
reference to technical notions in the field of geography."
21. The legal doctrine of the continental shelf was first articulated in detail in 1945 by
the "Truman Proclamation," Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. § 67 (1945), in which the
United States claimed the resources of the shelf as "appertaining to the United States,
subject to its jurisdiction and control." Although the United States claim was limited to
the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil, and expressly preserved the character of
the water above the continental shelf as high seas, subsequent claims by other nations were
not so restrained. See also G. MANGONE, THE UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL LAW,
AND THE BED OF THE SEAS, OCEAN SERIES 303 (1972).
22. See note 13, supra. Both Israel and Egypt are parties to the 1958 Convention.
The codification served a dual purpose of consolidating existing customary law and re-
forming legal rules which were no longer honored. See I H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 98 (E. Lauterpacht ed. 1970).
23. 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. I: "For the purpose of these arti-
cles, the term 'continental shelf' is used as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil area of
the submarine areas adjacent to the coast, but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a
depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superadjacent waters
admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and
subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands."
24. See, e.g., Study Prepared by the Secretariat of the United Nations for the Ad Hoc
Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the
Limits of National Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/AC 135/19, para. 24-26, June 21, 1968.
[Vol. 38
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shelf.25 It is uncertain what language will finally be adopted, but it
seems clear that the entire basin of the Gulf of Suez would be included
in any new definition of the continental shelf.
The 1958 Convention states that the "coastal state exercises over the
continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and ex-
ploiting its natural resources."'26 The ICNT adopts this exact lan-
guage.27 Unlike a territorial sea, the continental shelf area is not
assimilated to the territory of the state; the coastal state is merely given
certain rights in the continental shelf, and the water above it remains
high seas.28 The rights acquired in the continental shelf are exclusive 29
and exist by operation of law without any need for occupation or overt
claim.30
Uncertainty still exists over the division of the continental shelf area
beneath an enclosed or semi-enclosed body of water (such as the Gulf of
Suez) which is bordered by more than one nation. The 1958 Conven-
tion favors a median line determination, dividing the continental shelf
area along a line equidistant from the coastlines of the nations in-
volved.3' The ICNT proposes an "equitable" approach relying partly
on the median line method and partly on other "relevant circum-
stances."' 32 This argument was the central issue in the North Sea Conti-
25. Informal Composite Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/Wp.10, July 15,
1977, art. 76: "The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the sea-bed and subsoil of
the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolonga-
tion of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured
where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance." The
I.C.N.T., prepared in 1977 by the United Nations Conference of the Law of the Sea, is the
current draft for a revision of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf.
26. 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. 2(1).
27. I.C.N.T., art. 77(1).
28. See, e.g., I. BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 223: "The term 'sovereignty' was deliber-
ately avoided as it was feared that this term, redolent of territorial sovereignty and three
dimensional control, would prejudice the status of high seas of the waters over the shelf."
29. 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. 2(2); I.C.N.T., art. 77(2).
30. 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. 2(3); I.C.N.T., art. 77(3); Fitzmau-
rice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951-54: Points of Sub-
stantive Law 1, 31 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 371, 372-73 (1954).
31. 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. 6(1): "Where the same continental
shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more States whose coasts are opposite each
other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined
by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary
line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the [median line, every point of
which is equidistant from] the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea of each State is measured."
32. I.C.N.T., art. 83(1): "The delimitation of the continental shelf between adjacent or
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nental ShelfCases33 in which the International Court of Justice held that
the equidistant approach was not a rule of customary international law
even though it had been codified in the 1958 Convention. 34
The continental shelf rights described in the 1958 Convention and
the ICNT attach to the "coastal state," 35 a term which remains unde-
fined. Although Israel has never explicitly claimed sovereignty over the
Sinai, it has remained in undisputed possession of large portions of the
peninsula for over ten years. The central issue, therefore, is whether
Israel's status makes her a "coastal state" entitled to exercise the rights
recognized in the 1958 Convention and the ICNT, or whether Egypt re-
mains the "coastal state" despite the Israeli occupation.
Belligerent Occupation
In the language of international law, Israel is a belligerent occupant
of much of the Sinai. Territory is considered occupied when it is "actu-
ally placed under the :uthority of the hostile army."'36 This status con-
fers on Israel competence to administer the territory under its control
and the duty to protect the inhabitants and their property.37 This status
does not depend on the legitimacy of the occupation and is granted
merely to establish some kind of order out of the chaos which normally
follows an invasion.38
opposite States shall be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles, em-
ploying, where appropriate, the median or equidistance line, and taking account of all the
relevant circumstances."
33. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [19601 I.C.J. 3 (by International Court of Jus-
tice).
34. Id. The parties to those cases were not directly bound by the 1958 Convention on
the Continental Shelf because Germany had never ratified it. The same result was reached
in the North Sea arbitration between England and France last year. Delimitation of the
Continental Shelf, International Court of Arbitration, United Kingdom and France (June
30, 1977).
35. 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. 2; I.C.N.T., art. 77.
36. Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and
annexed Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 42, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter cited as Hague Convention]. See also Dep't
of Army, FM27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, paras. 351-431, at 138-158 (1956) [hereinaf-
ter cited as U.S. Rules of Land Warfare]. The Hague Convention required all nations
ratifying the treaty to adopt regulations for their armed forces embodying the essential
terms of the treaty. The U.S. Rules of Land Warfare represent the United States' compli-
ance with the Hague Convention.
37. See Hague Convention, art. 43; U.S. Rules of Land Warfare, paras. 362-78, at
141-44. See also II L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 436-38 (7th ed. H. Lauterpacht
1952).
38. See, e.g., A. MCNAIR AND A. WATTS, THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF WAR 371 (4th ed.
[Vol. 38
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Belligerent occupation is to be differentiated from invasion and
from subjugation or conquest. An invading power may push through
enemy territory and then move on without ever having established that
effective control necessary for occupation. 39 Occupation is usually pre-
ceded by invasion, but the invasion continues only as long as significant
resistance remains. 4° Occupation may be distinguished by the fact that
the occupying power establishes some type of provisional administra-
tion.4 '
Occupation is also fundamentally different from conquest, which
implies that the occupying nation has acquired not only provisional con-
trol, but also the actual sovereignty of the occupied territory.4 2 Israel
has never made an explicit claim to sovereignty over the occupied terri-
tories in the Sinai, although some arguments have been put forward to
justify such a claim.43 It is generally recognized today that territory may
not be annexed by the use of force, 44 but an exception to the rule has
been suggested if the force was originally used in self defense.45 The
merits of such an argument have been greatly criticized.4 6 Israel's rights
will therefore be examined by treating Israel as a belligerent occupant
1966): "The morality or immorality of the occupation is irrelevant. When territory is in-
vaded and held, it must have some kind of government or there will be a state of chaos.
The law of belligerent occupation is an attempt to substitute for chaos some kind of order,
however harsh it may be."
39. Id. at 367-69; L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 37, at 434; Rules of Land Warfare, para.
352, at 138.
40. Rules of Land Warfare, para. 352, at 138.
41. Id.
42. See Rules of Land Warfare, para. 353, at 138; L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 37, at
432.
43. See, e.g., Y. BLUM, SECURE BOUNDARIES AND MIDDLE EAST PEACE (1971).
44. See, e.g., R. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 2 (1961): "No rule is clearer than the precept that no state may lawfully attempt to
exercise its sovereignty within the territory of another." See also G. VON GLAHN, THE
OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY 31 (1957). Much of the discussion in this area is
centered on article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
45. This exception was most recently recognized by the United Nations in 1974.
United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 3314 (XXIX) art. 5(3), Dec. 14, 1974.
29 F.A., U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974): "No territorial acquisition or special advantage resulting
from aggression is lawful nor should it be recognized as such." (emphasis added). Egypt
and the other Arabian states would have deleted the "resulting from aggression" language
and reworded the text so that acquisition of territory by force would be unlawful even if it
resulted from the exercise of force in self defense. See Stone, Holes and Loopholes in the
1974 Definition ofAggression, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 224 (1977).
46. See, e.g., H. CATTAN, PALESTINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1973); Shihata, Des-




and not as a sovereign.47
Egyptian authority in the Sinai has, of course, been diminished to
the extent that Israel has acquired rights in that territory. Egypt remains
the sovereign of the Sinai but has no present right to control it.4 8 Never-
theless, the "legal title" to the entire Sinai is preserved in Egypt through-
out the period in which Israel is in provisional control,49 even if Israel
should remain in control for many years. 50
The occupied territory in the Sinai is therefore divided between
Israel and Egypt on an abstract level. By the mere fact of occupation,
Israel has acquired the right and duty to administer the territory so as to
provide temporary order. However, the sovereignty or legal title of the
territory remains with Egypt. Although such a division between control
and sovereignty has existed in the past,51 it has never before been neces-
sary to determine which, if either, of the two nations involved is entitled
to exploit the adjacent continental shelf.
The rights which a belligerent occupant may exercise over property
in the occupied territory have not been well defined in international law.
'Most treaties containing provisions on belligerent occupation are under-
standably more concerned with the rights and obligations of individuals
living in the occupied territory.52 The only international treaty which
has made a serious effort to delineate the public and private property
rights involved is the Hague Convention of 1907. 53 Although neither
47. If Israel had seized the Sinai with the intent of annexing it, then Israel's claim to
Suez oil would rest not on the effects of the occupation but rather on the validity of Israel's
claim of sovereignty. Even if Israel could establish a valid title to the Sinai, however, it is
uncertain how the Gulf of Suez between "Israeli-Sinai" and Egypt would be divided. See
notes 31-34, supra, and accompanying text. Egypt might persuasively argue that this is the
sort of situation where the continental shelf area should not be divided along the median
line.
48. See A. McNAIR AND A. WATrS, THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF WAR (1966) at 368:
"The most important principle of law incident to belligerent occupation-one that was not
established until the last century-is that occupation does not displace or transfer sover-
eignty." See also L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 37, at 437.
49. See Wheeler, Governments de Facto, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 66 (1911). Egyptian sover-
eignty is dejure but not defacto.
50. Other instances where a nation preserved its legal title to territory during a period
of enemy occupation include the restoration of pre-Napoleonic sovereigns in 1815, and
preservation of Ethiopian sovereignty during the 1936 Italian annexation. Other examples
are given in H. CATrAN, PALESTINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 108-09 (1973).
51. Id.
52. The most important of these treaties is the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3517, T.I.A.S. No.
3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
53. Hague Convention, supra note 36. The Hague Convention obligated the parties
[Vol. 38
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Israel nor Egypt ratified the Hague Convention, the principles stated in
that treaty are now firmly established as customary law.5 4
Articles 47, 52, 53 and 55 of the Hague Convention concern the
treatment of property found in occupied territory.55 These provisions
give more protection to private property than to property owned by the
enemy state. Thus, private property, except for "munitions-de-guerre,"
is immune from seizure, and even "munitions-de-guerre" must be re-
turned or paid for after peace is restored. 56 Private property may be
requisitioned in order to supply the army of occupation, but the occu-
pant is obliged to pay for these supplies as soon as possible.57
Property found in the occupied territory and owned by the enemy
state is given less, yet significant, protection under the Hague Conven-
tion. The treaty makes a distinction between public movable and im-
movable property58 and allows the occupying power the right to seize all
movable property of the enemy state "which may be used for military
purposes." 59 With regard to public immovable property, however, the
occupying state "shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructu-
ary."
6 0
The principles enunciated in the Hague Convention are still the
most comprehensive expression of the rights and limitations associated
with the status of belligerent occupant. However, the treaty was drafted
before the legal concept of the continental shelf had become generally
accepted and before technology had developed sufficiently to allow
much offshore exploitation. 61 The provisions of the Hague Convention
must therefore be interpreted in light of subsequent developments in the
to adopt rules for their armies in accordance with the provisions of the treaty. The United
States complied with this requirement by adopting the U.S. Rules of Land Warfare, supra
note 36.
54. Cummings, Oil Resources in Occupied Arab Territories Under the Law of Belliger-
ent Occupation, 9 J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 533, 539-540 (1974), and authority cited therein.
55. These articles roughly correspond to paragraphs 393-417 of the U.S. Rules of
Land Warfare at 148-154.
56. Hague Convention, art. 53; U.S. Rules of Land Warfare, paras. 406, 410-11, at
152-53.
57. Hague Convention, art. 52-07; U.S. Rules of Land Warfare, paras. 409, 412-17, at
152-54.
58. Hague Convention, arts. 53, 55. See also L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 37, at 397.
59. Hague Convention, art. 53; U.S. Rules of Land Warfare, paras. 403-04, at 151-52.
60. Hague Convention, art. 55; U.S. Rules of Land Warfare, paras. 400-03, at 151.
61. The Ceylon Pearl Fisheries Ordinance of 1925, the precursor of the modem doc-
trine of the continental shelf, came years after the signing of the Hague Convention. See
Cosford, The Continental Shelf 1910-1945, 4 McGILL L.J. 245 (1958).
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law of the continental shelf.6 2
Competing Claims in the Gulf of Suez
As noted above, Israel and Egypt are claiming competing rights to
exploit the eastern half of that portion of the Gulf of Suez which is adja-
cent to Israeli-occupied Sinai.63 Israel has asserted its claim by forcibly
evicting Egyptian-American interests and by drilling its own wells in the
disputed area. Egypt has asserted its claim by criticizing the Israeli ac-
tion, but has been unable or unwilling to stop it.
There are at least three possible ways to treat these competing
claims:64
(1) Israel is the occupant of the adjacent territory and the "de facto"
occupant of the disputed continental shelf area and should therefore be
given exclusive exploitation rights.
(2) Egypt is the sovereign of the adjacent territory and the disputed
continental shelf area should be treated as appurtenant to the sovereign.
(3) The rights of both nations are defective and should not be recog-
nized for the duration of the occupation.
Israeli Rights
The validity of Israeli oil rights in the Gulf should not depend on
the legitimacy of the Sinai occupation itself.65 If the rights granted to a
62. It is arguable, however, that the provisions of the Hague Convention should apply
directly to the facts of the instant case. Article 42 provides that the "occupation extends
only to the territory where [the authority of the hostile army] has been established and can
be recognized." Whether the continental shelf has been subjected to the authority of the
Israeli forces could be treated as a question of fact, and Israel has apparently been success-
ful in establishing military control over the disputed area of the gulf.
The title of the Hague Convention refers specifically to land warfare, but this in itself
should not prohibit the application of the Hague Convention to continental shelf areas. It
is obvious, however, that the continental shelf is not susceptible of the same sort of "occu-
pation" as land areas.
63. See text at notes 2-9, supra.
64. There are, of course, many variations on each of these alternatives. The three
alternatives discussed here are only representative of the possible approaches.
65. See text at note 39, supra. However, a contrary result was reached in the case of
N V de Baiaafsche Petroleum Mastschappy . The War Damage Comm'n 23 I.L.R. 810
[hereinafter cited as Baiaafsche] (Court of Appeal, Singapore 1956). In that case, Indone-
sian oil companies were allowed to recover compensation for oil seized by Japan during the
occupation of Indonesia in World War II. The court held that Japan could claim no bene-
fits under the Hague Convention as a belligerent occupant because Japan was found to
have been an aggressor. Any seizure by an unlawful occupant was treated as pillage.
This view was argued in the context of the Israeli occupation in Shihata, Destination Em-
COMMENTS
belligerent occupant by the Hague Regulations were contingent on the
legality of the occupation, then the nation whose land is being occupied
would always claim that the occupation was unlawful and that the occu-
pant could acquire no rights therein.66 It is evident that most nations at
war claim to be acting in self defense or in furtherance of some just
cause.
Although the legitimacy of the occupation may be relevant in ana-
lyzing claims of territorial acquisition,67 the laws regulating the "mana-
gerial" rights and duties of the belligerent occupant are based on
different policy goals. 68 Legitimacy of occupation is relevant to acquisi-
tion of territory because an aggressor should not be allowed to profit
from his unlawful act: ex injuria ius non oritur.69 This principle is irrele-
vant to the application of the Hague Regulations, which are intended to
provide some order and stability to the territory under enemy control
regardless of whether the enemy's possession is the result of aggression
or self defense.
There is some doubt whether the new Israeli drilling operation in
bargo o/Arab Oil" Its Legality Under International Law, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 591, 601-02
(1974).
66. See Cummings, Oil Resources in Occupied Arab Territories Under the Law of Bel-
ligerent Occupation, 9 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 533, 548-550 (1974).
67. See Gerson, War, Conquered Territory, and Military Occupation in the Contempo-
rary International Legal System, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 525, 542-556 (1977) at 556: "It must
be realized that the lawful-unlawful dichotomy has no application to the management
sphere of occupation, but only to the acquisition of held territory, insofar as claims to
potential acquisition of title by aggressor-occupants are not recognized." The legality of
the Israeli occupation has, of course, been greatly debated. The focal point of this debate
seems to have been the controversial Resolution 242. Res. No. 242, Nov. 22, 1967, U.N.
Doc. S/PV 1382, at 36. The resolution seems to have been written with "deliberately
preserved ambiguity." Y. BLUM, SECURE BOUNDARIES AND MIDDLE EAST PEACE 11
(1971). The resolution requires Israel to withdraw to "secure boundaries" in exchange for
recognition of its right to exist. It is therefore uncertain whether Israel must withdraw all
the way back to 1947 Armistice lines or only to what are determined to be "secure bounda-
ries." Further, it is uncertain whether Israel must withdraw from the occupied territory
prior to recognition by Arabian nations. Compare Rostow, The Illegality ofthe Arab At-
tack on Israel of October 6, 1973, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 272 (1975) with Shihata, Destination
Embargo ofArab Oil: Its Legality Under International Law, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 591 (1974).
68. See text at note 38, supra.
69. However, the significance of this principle is greatly limited by the fact that there
is no real sanction to enforce it: "[International law can no more refuse to recognize that a
finally successful conquest does change the title to territory than municipal law can change




the Gulf of Suez can be justified.70 Oil in the ground is a public immov-
able,71 and therefore, under the Hague Convention, Israel can only exer-
cise the rights of a usufructuary over such property.72 Although a
usufructuary may exploit existing wells, it is generally accepted that new
wells may not be drilled.73 Thus, while Israel might have been justified
in exploiting the existing Sinai oilfields of Abu Rudeis and Belayim,
74
the Hague Convention denies Israel, as a mere usufructuary, the right to
drill new oilfields.75
If Israel has no right to drill new wells in the occupied territory it-
self, then it certainly has no right to drill new wells in the adjacent conti-
nental shelf. Israeli rights in the continental shelf derive from, and can
in no event exceed, the rights which may be exercised in the adjacent
70. But see Gerson, Off-Shore Oil Exploration by a Belligerent Occupant- The Gui/of
Suez Dispute, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 725 (1977).
71. Bataafsche, supra note 67, is the most important case interpreting the classification
of oil as an immovable for purposes of article 55 of the Hague Convention.
72. Hague Convention, art. 55; U.S. Rules of Land Warfare, para. 400, at 151. See
also I. BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 99; IV G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 387 (1943); L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 37, at 397, 403.
73. In civilian theory it is generally accepted that the usufructuary may not open new
wells. French doctrine distinguishes "fruits" and "products." Fruits are things which are
produced periodically by the corpus and may be removed without impairing its value.
Products are things which are part of the principal thing and their removal will diminish its
value. Oil is a product and may not be removed by a usufructuary. Louisiana courts have
reached the same result under the "open mines" doctrine. A usufructuary may work
mines which are open at the commencement but may not open new mines. See Yianno-
poulos, Rights ofthe Usufructuary. Louisiana and Comparative Law, 27 LA. L. REV. 668
(1967). See also LA. CiV. CODE arts. 551-52; Gueno v. Medlenka, 238 La. 1081, 117 So. 2d
817 (1960), noted in 20 LA. L. REV. 773 (1960).
There is, however, a contrary view. See Gerson, Off-Shore Oil Exploration by a Bel-
ligerent Occupant.: The Gulof Suez Dispute, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 725 (1977). The "open
mines" doctrine is founded on the principle that the usufructuary should not be allowed to
"waste" the property subject to the usufruct. The cited article makes the persuasive argu-
ment that the value of the continental shelf area in question will actually be greatly en-
hanced by the opening of the new oil wells. There seem to be several problems with this
argument. Although the value of the territory may be enhanced at first, this increased
value would be overcome if Israel continued to occupy the Sinai for a sufficiently long
period of time. Also, it is technologically possible to produce very large quantities of oil
from a given field in a relatively short period of time, but only at the expense of efficiency.
Therefore, genuine waste would result if Israeli producers were encouraged to exploit fully
as many new fields as quickly as possible.
74. The large fields of Abu Rudeis and Belayim, on the eastern shore of the Sinai,
were exploited by Israel following their seizure in the Six Day War. In 1975, these oilfields
were returned to Egyptian control in the Second Sinai Disengagement Pact.
75. Cummings, Oil Resources in Occupied Arab Territories Under the Law ofBelliger-
ent Occupation, 9 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 533, 559, 560 (1974).
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land territory. A more difficult problem would have been presented if
Israel had attempted to continue production from existing offshore
wells.
7 6
Israel is also unable to justify the opening of new oil wells under the
"munitions-de-guerre" exception. Although an occupying army is per-
mitted to seize public property which may be used for military pur-
poses,77 this rule should be limited to seizure of movable property which
is susceptible of direct military use. 78 Moreover, the right to seize
"munitions-de-guerre" would only justifiy seizure for military purposes,
and the right would not exist after the cessation of the immediate hostili-
ties.79
In opposition to these principles of international law are several im-
portant policy arguments which favor the Israeli claims to the disputed
oil. Israel is in physical control of the territory closest to the oil and
therefore, from a technological standpoint, is better situated to exploit
the oilfields effectively. Israel is also apparently in control of the eastern
half of the Gulf itself and therefore, from a military standpoint, is in a
better position to protect the drilling operation. Finally, the valid goals
to be accomplished by belligerent occupation are furthered by extending
the rights of the occupant in this way. The products of the drilling
maintain the occupation by helping to supply the occupying army, and
the opening of new oilfields increases the coercive effect of the occupa-
tion by increasing the value of the occupied territory. These policy ar-
guments should not, of course, alter the fact that current international
law does not give Israel the right to drill new wells in the occupied terri-
tory. The rights of a belligerent occupant are not contingent on the mo-
rality of the occupant's cause or the economic and political benefits
involved.
Egyptian Rights
The fact that Israel should not be allowed to drill new wells in the
disputed area does not imply that Egypt should be free to do so: Egypt's
right to drill for oil derives from its status as sovereign over the adjacent
76. In such a situation it would have been necessary to determine whether the occu-
pant has the same rights in the continental shelf that it has on the adjacent land.
77. "Fuel" is specifically included within the definition of "munitions-de-guerre" in
U.S. Rules of Land Warfare, para. 412, at 153. See also Hague Convention, art. 53.
78. See Bataafsche, supra note 65; Lauterpacht, The Hague Regulations and the




territory.80 Considerable support can be found for the argument that
rights in the continental shelf adhere to the legal or de jure title.8' But a
strong argument also exists that, even if Egyptian sovereignty carries
with it certain rights in the continental shelf, Israel is justified in prevent-
ing the exercise of such rights while the adjacent territory is still under its
occupation.
Paragraph 376 of the United States Rules of Land Warfare recog-
nizes the occupying power's right to "regulate commercial intercourse in
the occupied territory" in furtherance of the purposes of the occupa-
tion.8 2 In particular, the article notes that the occupant will "usually
find it advisable to forbid intercourse between the occupied territory and
the territory still in the possession of the enemy."' 83 It is doubtful
whether the Rules intended to include the adjacent continental shelf area
within the meaning of "occupied territory," and it is also questionable
whether "commercial intercourse" was meant to apply to the unilateral
drilling operations of the Egyptian oil lessees. Nevertheless, the princi-
ple of the article seems to support the Israeli action in ejecting the
GUPCO oil rig in 1976.
A related factor is control of the Gulf area itself. Although it is well
established today that rights in the adjacent continental shelf appertain
to the littoral state without any need for actual physical control,8 4 it is
arguable that control should be relevant where the ownership of the lit-
toral territory is divided between a sovereign and an occupant. Al-
though control is irrelevant under continental shelf doctrine because the
shelf is treated as a natural prolongation of the state,8 5 it may gain
significance if two separate states have rights in the coastal territory.
The rights the Egyptian government has in the disputed Gulf area
should be distinguished from the rights held by private interests under
80. See notes 48-50, supra, and accompanying text.
81. A number of writers have defined continental shelf rights as appurtenant to the
adjacent sovereign. See, e.g., I. BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 111: "Sovereignty is not only
used as a description of legal personality accompanied by independence but also as a refer-
ence to various types of rights, indefeasible except by special grant, in the patrimony of a
sovereign state, for example the 'sovereign rights' a coastal state has over the resources of
the continental shelf." J. WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 188 (2d ed. 1910): "Within
that extent [i.e. the territorial sea], the water and its bed are territorial and the wealth of
both is the property of the territorial sovereign." (emphasis added). But see G. MANoONE,
THE ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (1967).
82. U.S. Rules of Land Warfare, para. 376, at 144.
83. Id.
84. I.C.N.T., art. 77(3).
85. I.C.N.T., art. 76.
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Egyptian title.86 GUPCO, the corporation owned jointly by the Egyp-
tian government and AMOCO, was given the right to drill in parts of the
Gulf prior to the Israeli occupation of the Sinai. 87 AMOCO might
therefore argue that it acquired a property right which vested at the time
the lease was granted. AMOCO's rights might be limited by Israel's
need for security, but Israel would still be obliged to compensate
AMOCO for its loss if there has been a seizure of private property even
if the seizure was for a legitimate purpose. 88 As long as Israel merely
prevents AMOCO from operating under its concession then there is no
seizure, but if Israel itself drills into the leased area then a genuine
seizure may occur.
There are several policy reasons for favoring Egyptian claims over
Israeli claims in the disputed region. Egypt exercised both de facto and
de jure sovereignty over all of the territory in question for many centu-
ries prior to the Israeli occupation in 1967. To permit the recent occu-
pant to exploit resources in territory historically belonging to Egypt will
engender even greater hostility. Also, sanctioning occupation by al-
lowing these benefits is undesirable. Whatever the merits of the Israeli
occupation, it is clear that other nations have recently begun to "annex"
islands and other territory primarily to acquire continental shelf rights.
The Israeli use of the Gulf might therefore set a precedent for similar but
less justifiable claims. Finally, if GUPCO is denied the right to exploit
its lease, then the rights of the neutral concession holder, AMOCO, will
be prejudiced.
A Moratorium on Drilling
Neither Israel nor Egypt is bound by a treaty obligation dictating
rights in the disputed area of the Gulf of Suez, nor do accepted princi-
ples of international law provide a clear statement of Israeli or Egyptian
rights. The Israeli occupation of the Sinai has certainly undermined
Egyptian rights in the adjacent Gulf. At the same time, Egyptian sover-
eignty over the Sinai remains a limitation on Israel's use of the territory.
Therefore, neither Israel nor Egypt should be deemed competent to drill
in the disputed area until the de facto and de jure sovereignty of the
adjacent territory are reunited in one nation.
86. U.S. Rules of Land Warfare, paras. 394-412, at 149-153. In particular, note the
treatment of property of "mixed ownership" described in paragraph 394. As to whether
oil still in the ground is susceptible of private ownership while still in the ground, see
Bataafsche, supra note 65.
87. See text accompanying notes 2-5, supra.
88. Hague Convention, art. 53; U.S. Rules of Land Warfare, para. 403, at 151.
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Under this analysis, Israel was probably within its rights when, on
September 2, 1976, it forcibly prevented GUPCO from exercising its
1964 lease rights in the eastern half of the Gulf. Although the AMOCO
oil rig escorted by two Egyptian gunboats posed no serious threat to Is-
raeli security when brought into position seven miles off the Sinai coast,
Israel was probably justified in establishing a buffer area in which Egypt
would not be allowed to operate. Israel will find it more difficult to
justify its own drilling operations begun in 1977. Although from a polit-
ical standpoint the new drilling operations might be a valuable bargain-
ing tool in the Israeli-Egyptian peace negotiations, they seem totally
without support under the general precepts of international law.
The policy arguments discussed above can for the most part be
satisified by suspending all drilling operations until title to the territory is
reunited in one nation. However, it must be noted that the most impor-
tant policy issue for both Israel and Egypt is the need for petroleum re-
sources for their respective economies. This is, of course, essentially a
political question, and not an issue which can be resolved by a morato-
rium on drilling.
In the absence of binding treaty obligations or enforceable sanc-
tions, neither nation would likely be willing to submit to a moratorium.
Even when treaty obligations and customary international law are abso-
lutely clear, nations will generally comply only when they perceive com-
pliance to be in their national interest. For the present, therefore, the
nation with sufficient military power imposes its will. With the in-
creased importance of offshore resources and the continuing instability
of international boundaries, future treaties will need to address the prob-
lem of provisional control and exploitation of disputed continental shelf
areas.
Richard A. Curry
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